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Dementia and Epistemic Authority: 







 Imagine you have spent nearly all of the seventy years of your adult life being an 
organized and authoritative woman, raising three daughters, working as a clinical psychologist, 
maintaining many relationships and friendships. Now you’ve noticed more and more trouble 
remembering things, confusion about how to implement a plan or even what the right plan 
should be, even about things you know you used to do easily like shopping or making 
reservations. Imagine that, on top of all of this, one of those daughters you raised so competently 
is now sitting in front of you telling you that you’re so incompetent now that you don’t even 
know whether you’re capable of writing a letter to a friend. Recently, there has been much 
research applying the tools of discourse analysis to the talk of individuals with cognitive 
impairments (Cherney, Shadden, & Coelho, 1998). Many studies have examined the coherence, 
informational content, and topic management ability of older adults with various forms of 
dementia. In this case study I examine the interactions between a woman diagnosed with 
dementia of the Alzheimer’s type (DAT) and her daughter from a slightly different angle. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that the mother, Sophia,
2
 is sensitive to her daughter’s explicit 
challenges to her epistemic authority over domains of knowledge traditionally assumed to be her 
own, such as her abilities, experiences, and knowledge. Through skillful application of a range of 
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techniques, Sophia is able to successfully reframe the talk to establish herself as the authority on 
these matters, working to minimize loss of face (Goffman, 1967). The observation that Sophia is 
sensitive to this implied asymmetry and works to minimize it has implications for caretakers and 
families of dementia patients in terms of minimizing tension and avoiding a cycle of learned 
helplessness (Lubinski, 1991). 
Background 
Dementia and Conversation Analysis 
 The subject of this case study, Sophia, has been diagnosed with dementia of the 
Alzheimer’s type (DAT), a type of dementia characterized by cognitive impairments including 
losses in short term and procedural memory and executive and planning functions (Hales, 
Yudofsky, & Gabbard, 2008). Discourse analysis of various types has been used to investigate 
the speech of dementia patients in a range of specific areas, including, but not limited to, 
coherence and cohesion (Dijkstra, Bourgeois, & Allen, 2004; DiSanti, Koenig, Obler, &    
Goldberger, 1994; Laine, Laakso, Vuorinen, & Rinne, 1998), topic management (Garcia & 
Joanette, 1994; Mentis, Briggs-Whitaker, & Gramigna, 1995), repair (McNamara, Obler, Au, 
Durso, & Albert, 1992; Orange, Van Gennep, Miller, & Johnson, 1998), turn-taking (Ripich, 
Vertes, Whitehouse, Fulton, & Ekelman, 1991), and informational content (Chenery & Murdoch, 
1994; Cherney & Canter, 1993; Ehrlich, Obler, & Clark, 1997). 
 Many of these studies, however, rely on picture description tasks, interviews, or other 
experimental means of eliciting the discourse sample (Perkins, Whitworth, & Lesser, 1998). 
Perkins et al. point out that these methods might “result in a discourse sample that is unlikely to 
reflect what happens between people with dementia and their caregivers on a daily basis” (p. 35). 
Because of this, they propose conversation analysis (CA) as the best method to really uncover 
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the everyday use of language  between dementia patients and their caregivers, families, and 
friends. They also point out that CA lends itself to analysis not only of the practices and 
(dis)abilities of the patients, but also those of their conversation partners, uncovering specific 
ways in which caretakers can encourage communication as much as possible. To that end, they 
outline the Conversation Analysis Profile for People with Cognitive Impairment (CAPPCI) 
(originally proposed in Perkins, Whitworth, & Lesser, 1997), a method that combines a close 
conversation analysis of around ten minutes of interaction between the patient and the caretaker 
with a detailed interview with the caretaker. Through comparing the interview and the analysis, 
light can be shed on any discrepancies between the caretaker’s perceptions and the practices, 
abilities, impairments, and strategies uncovered by the analysis, which in turn can help the 
caretaker discover new strategies, and avoid either overestimating the patient’s abilities (leading 
to communication breakdowns) or underestimating them (leading to a cycle of learned 
helplessness (Lubinski, 1991). 
 Though not exemplifying the CAPPCI as such, Mikesell (2009) provides an excellent 
example of the application of CA to uncover both interactional patterns in the speech of one 
dementia patient, and strategies used by caretakers to accommodate these patterns. Specifically, 
she examines the interactions of SD, a man with frontotemporal dementia, and observes that 
SD’s turns generally display local coherence with the previous turn, but often fail to demonstrate 
understanding of the broader aims of the sequence. For example, to open-ended wh-questions, 
SD will often respond “I don’t know,” a response that is locally type-conforming but often 
ignores the implications for the longer sequence of talk of failing to offer a specific answer. In 
response to this, Mikesell finds, SD’s interlocutors shape their talk to encourage meaningful 
responses from SD by constraining the types of their turns to, for example, yes/no questions 
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rather than wh-questions. Interestingly, Mikesell points out that this accommodation 
simultaneously allows SD to demonstrate the competencies that he does possess, by helping him 
participate effectively in the conversation, and highlights his incompetency by creating unnatural 
sequences and strings of test questions that would be very unlikely to occur in conversation 
between fully competent adults. 
 On that note, a final consideration about the discourse of cognitively impaired adults 
relevant to this study concerns learned helplessness, mentioned above (Lubinski, 1991). Lubinski 
describes learned helplessness in this context as a destructive cycle in which a diagnosis of 
dementia and some amount of innate loss of ability are reinforced by lowered expectations by 
family and caretakers and reduced opportunities to engage in normal life, leading to further 
deterioration of abilities. This cycle can function in subtle ways in the realm of communication, 
as the conversation partners of dementia patients shape their talk differently because of 
assumptions about the patient’s impairment, leading potentially to the further deterioration of 
communication skills as the patient internalizes these assumptions. It is assumptions like these 
(among other factors) that Lubinski argues can lead to dementia patients lowering their 
expectations of themselves, triggering a cycle of learned helplessness. 
Epistemic Authority and Disagreement 
 Conversation analysis is concerned with understanding the underlying systems to which 
participants in talk-in-interaction orient and through which practices such as turn-taking and 
sequence structure are organized (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2007). In this 
section I discuss the notion of preference, and specifically how it relates to the acts of agreeing 
and disagreeing, as well as some findings on the role of epistemic authority in assessment 
sequences. 
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 Conversation can be thought of as being built around adjacency pairs, or more 
colloquially, statements and responses that go naturally together (Schegloff, 2007). For example, 
when one party proffers an invitation, this makes conditionally relevant either an acceptance or 
rejection of the invitation: if an appropriate second pair part (SPP) to the first pair part (FPP) of 
an invitation fails to occur reasonably soon in the interaction, participants will likely orient to 
this as deviant or in need of explanation (Schegloff, 2007). The notion of preference concerns 
cases in which more than one type of relevant SPP exists – for example, acceptance or rejection 
of an invitation, agreement or disagreement with an assessment, and so on. In these cases 
researchers have often found that a certain preference structure operates, causing an asymmetry 
between the different relevant types of response. Sacks (1987), for instance, demonstrates a 
preference for agreement over disagreement when responding to yes/no interrogatives. This 
preference can be seen in the shaping of the talk by the recipient of the question; agreeing 
responses are generally delivered quickly and without mitigation, while disagreements often 
follow pauses, hedging, or partial initial agreements. When a pause or hesitation marker 
foreshadows subsequent disagreement, the first speaker may preemptively reframe the question 
so that what was originally a negative response becomes a positive, agreeing one, showing that 
the preference structure is oriented to by both parties. 
 Pomerantz (1984) examined preference structure in the case of assessments, and found, 
not surprisingly, a general preference for agreement with assessment FPPs. In other words, SPPs 
that express agreement are generally delivered in a preferred format, quickly and without 
mitigation, while disagreement is generally expressed with some bundle of features in the turn 
design indicating a dispreferred response (hesitation, hedging, partial agreement prefacing, 
accounts, etc.). However, Pomerantz makes the important observation that preference structure is 
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sensitive to the specific type of assessment sequence, and that other broad preference structures 
can, in a sense, trump the preference for agreement. In sequences in which the FPP assessment is 
a self-deprecation, she demonstrates a reversal of the normal preference order, such that 
disagreements with self-deprecating assessments are delivered in a preferred format, and 
agreements carry the features of dispreference. Kotthoff (1993) further complicates the picture of 
the agreement/disagreement preference structure by examining disputes. She observes that in 
extended dispute sequences, once both parties orient to the talk as being a dispute, preference 
order can again flip, so that disagreement, or standing up for one’s original position, seems to be 
preferred. In this context, agreement is seen as a loss of face and must be managed carefully; in 
fact, Kotthoff finds that “concession,” (eventual agreement by one party to the main point of the 
other) is often delivered hesitantly and with much initial mitigation. The general preference for 
agreement, therefore, is highly context-sensitive and can be overridden by other factors, such as 
social concerns (don’t agree if it means putting down your conversation partner) or concerns of 
face and defending one’s own original claims. 
  An additional factor at play in sequences involving agreement or disagreement with 
claims is negotiation of epistemic authority; in other words, which speaker has primary authority 
and rights to assess the domain in question. Heritage and Raymond (2005) show that the speaker 
making an initial assessment (the FPP) has a sort of de facto claim to superior authority, and both 
participants in the interaction can work to downplay, challenge, or reverse that claim. For 
example, a first speaker can downplay his or her superior authority by asking for confirmation 
from the second speaker, or a second speaker can assert independent and equal access to the 
knowledge in question through “oh”-prefaced or upgraded responses. Heritage and Raymond 
discuss these techniques in the context of face (Goffman, 1967), claiming that even in the case of 
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agreement in a context where agreement is preferred, there are delicate issues of claims to 
superior epistemic authority which are oriented to by the participants.  
 Overall, then, the structures and forces at play in the course of a sequence involving 
assessments of some form are varied and potentially contradictory. The general preference for 
agreement may be subverted by desire not to threaten the face of the first speaker (in the case of 
self-deprecating assessments) or not to lose face oneself; turn design, in addition, may be 
influenced not only be the preference structure in operation, but by concerns of maintaining the 
proper hierarchy of epistemic rights to knowledge. 
Data Analysis 
 The data examined for this study consist of six hours of video recordings taken, with 
Sophia’s knowledge and consent, on three separate occasions on which she was visiting with her 
eldest daughter, Lucy, and other members of Lucy’s family. However, all of the excerpts that 
will be analyzed in detail in this study come from the third occasion, a visit by Lucy to Sophia at 
her nursing home in the fall of 2010.   
 The subject, Sophia, is an eighty-eight year old woman living in the health center wing of 
a continuum of care retirement home, diagnosed with early-to-intermediate DAT. While 
Sophia’s executive functions and short-term memory are impaired enough that she cannot live 
independently even within the retirement home, her long-term memory and many other cognitive 
functions are still mostly intact, including the ability to participate in conversation. Having spent 
her entire adult life as an extremely competent and organized woman, Sophia now finds herself 
in a position where her short-term memory often fails her and she feels overwhelmed by tasks 
that used to come easily. Sophia is keenly aware of her declining ability to both remember things 
and perform routine tasks on her own, as evidenced by many comments to her daughter declaring 
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things too hard or complicated for her. Despite this level of awareness of her own limits, Sophia 
still appears to respond to what I refer to as other-initiated challenges to her claims about her 
own situation or memory of events by attempting to refute or minimize the challenge. In other 
words, while she does not hesitate, around her daughter, to make negative assessments of her 
own abilities, she is still sensitive to implications that her own assessments are inaccurate or 
lacking. I focus my analysis on sequences in which Lucy initiates an explicit challenge to a claim 
or assessment made by Sophia about something reasonably assumed to be more in Sophia’s 
domain of authority than Lucy’s. I will examine three extracts that exhibit such challenges. Close 
analysis demonstrates that Sophia is sensitive to these challenges and employs a variety of 
techniques in order to reestablish herself as the authority on her own abilities, situation, and 
knowledge.  
 The first example occurs while Lucy is looking through cards that have been sent to 
Sophia. We join the talk as Lucy is reading the text of a card sent to Sophia by her friend Roz. In 
this and the examples that follow, Sophia’s assertions are indicated with an arrow marked A, 





42 Luc:  ((reading)) I: want to wish you a shana tova and make 
43   a promise to visit your room. tsk ↑Oh my ↑goodness. 
44   (0.2) My husband Eli was just [ diag ]nosed= 
45 Sop:                 [°Yeah.°] 
46 Luc:  =with cancer of the tongue. 
47 Sop:  Yeah. 
48 Luc:  tsk Needs to have some chemo and radiation. 
49   (1.0) 
50 Luc:  ((continues reading)) .hh We are in for a rough few 
51   months but the prognosis is a good one and we must 
52   be hopeful and positive. Please keep us in your 
53   thoughts. tsk Bo:y. (.) This would be a good one to 
54   answer. 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix 1 for a transcription key. 
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55 Sop: →A Uh now- (.) he:re’s a- (.) I don’ know whether I did  
56   already. 
57   (0.2) 
58 Luc: →C Unless- (0.2) i- i- it’s too hard for you. H- how 
59   would you have done [that.] 
60 Sop: →R           [ I ] could have done it. 
61 Luc:  Really? 
62 Sop:  {((nods))- (0.6)} Mmhm, 
 
 Despite appearing to remember some of the content of the card, after Lucy’s assertion in 
lines 53-54 that this card would be a good one to answer, Sophia makes a statement about her 
own lack of memory about whether or not she answered the card. Lucy’s response does not 
address the issue of Sophia’s memory; rather, she directly challenges Sophia’s ability to have 
answered the letter. Importantly, not only does Lucy’s turn make a negative assessment of 
Sophia’s ability to perform a task that would be routine to a fully competent adult, but by 
declaring Sophia unable to have answered the letter, she contradicts Sophia’s own description of 
the situation. Implicit in Sophia’s statement of her lack of memory as a problem is an assumption 
that she is capable of having answered the letter, making the question of whether or not she did a 
concern. Lucy is not only saying you can’t have done this, but is also implying your own 
understanding of your abilities is inaccurate. Note that while Lucy’s turns shows some features 
of dispreferred turn design, such as hesitation and cut-offs, the first actual statement in her turn, 
“it’s too hard for you,” is not mitigated in strength or authority. 
 Sophia’s response in line 60 is a clear and straightforward example of her ability to 
respond effectively to challenges to her epistemic authority. What is notable about her response 
is its blunt delivery; despite being a direct contradiction of her daughter’s assertion, it is 
delivered without mitigation, hesitation, or any other markers of a dispreferred action. It also 
stands out as one of the only instances in the entirety of the data examined for this study in which 
Sophia overlaps her talk with that of her conversation partner. By disagreeing with Lucy without 
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any of the normal features of doing (dispreferred) disagreement, Sophia subtly emphasizes that 
this is an area about which she has the right to make a blunt, unmitigated declaration, and that it 
is her assessment, and not Lucy’s, that is relevant. In a way her turn can better be seen as 
correcting Lucy than as disagreeing with her, and implicit in the right to correct is the right to be 
considered the ultimate authority on the matter. It could also be seen as a mini-example of a 
dispute sequence as in Kotthoff (1993), where Sophia’s defense of her original (implicit) claim is 
delivered as a preferred response. Lucy’s reply of “really?”, while still displaying some doubt or 
disbelief, does go along with the switch to deferring, at least on the surface, to Sophia’s role as 
primary assessor of her own abilities. 
 While the exchange analyzed above is my focus, it is interesting to examine the 
development of Sophia’s position over the next couple of minutes. After a four-second pause 
Sophia strengthens her contention that she could have written back by stating that she thinks she 
did: 
(1b) 
63   (4.0) 
64 Sop: →A I think I did do it. 
65   (2.0) 
66 Sop:  heh hh Not a good [(  )] 
67 Luc:           [ You ] fou:nd a notecard and  
68   a stamp, a:nd her address,= 
69 Sop:  ((nod)) 
70 Luc:  =and you figured out what to sa:y? 
77   (0.4) 
78 Sop:  I [think so.] 
79 Luc:   [ About  ] her husband who has cancer? 
78   (1.8) 
79 Sop:  U:::h, (1.6) not the- maybe that directly but (.) 
80   that a:ll- a:ll of the (.) problems would ea:se up 
81   or= 
82 Luc:  Mmm. [ ↑Okay,  ] 
83 Sop:    =[(something.)] 
84   (5.0) 
85 Luc:  We::ll- (0.4) Okay, so that’s possible, 
86 Sop:  Yeah. 
87 Luc:  But if you’re not su:re,= 
88 Sop:  ((shaking head)) I’m not [sure.] 
89 Luc:              =[then ]there’s no ha:rm in  
90   writing her another note,=  
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91 Sop:   [ ((nod)) ] 
 
In line 78 Sophia is not swayed from her position by Lucy’s elaboration of the tasks involved, 
and although Lucy’s final question in line 79 is greeted with hesitation and disfluency, Sophia’s 
ability to produce a vague description of what she said in her supposed return letter seems to 
block Lucy from expressing further doubt. After an extended silence, Lucy appears to cut off the 
beginning of her turn in line 85 to explicitly concede the possibility that Sophia answered, 
reversing her claim back in line 58 that it’s too hard for Sophia to do. Lucy then moves to 
reestablish alignment by focusing on the fact that Sophia isn’t certain she did write the note, 
which appears effective as the next several turns of talk are occupied with agreement that it’s 
important to make sure she answered this letter, and suggestions by Lucy of how she could word 
the new note. After a short pause, however, Sophia jumps back in with a revised claim about the 
state of her certainty about previous events: 
(1c) 
109   (0.6) 
110 Sop: →A I did write a note (to it), and I think I mailed it. 
111 Luc:  But before or after you got this. 
112 Sop:  After. 
113 Luc:  After. ↑Okay, ↑well, 
114   (3.0) 
115 Luc:  That’s good then. 
116   (2.0) 
 
In line 110, Sophia shifts the epistemic strength of her claims to assert her having written the 
letter as fact, and shifting the “I think” to apply only to whether she mailed it. That Lucy is still 
not entirely convinced is hinted in the extended gap in line 114, but finally in line 115 Lucy 
seems to concede the truth of Sophia’s claim (and therefore also her right to make it, despite 
Lucy’s doubts). It is after this concession, and another extended pause, that this sequence 
culminates in Sophia’s repeating Lucy’s suggestion (from lines 89-90), delivered as a first pair 
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part with no indications of awareness that Lucy has been suggesting this for the past twenty-six 
lines of talk: 
(1d) 
117 Sop: → I could write her another no:te. 
118 Luc:  Right. You could. And just sa::y (0.4) hope things are 
119   going we:ll, [°whatever,°] 
120 Sop:         [ ((nods)) ] 
 
The most interesting features of Sophia’s turn in line 117 are the word “another” and the 
emphasis on “no:te.” The latter feature seems to mark “note” as new information in some sense, 
in this case projecting the implication that she is introducing this suggestion on her own, rather 
than agreeing with Lucy’s suggestion. Whether this is in any sense a purposeful manipulation of 
the talk or whether Sophia simply lost track of the previous thirty seconds of interaction enough 
to honestly believe she was introducing this idea herself is impossible to determine. In either case, 
however, the effect is to recast Sophia as at least a co-author of the suggested course of action, 
and to put Lucy in the position of providing the second pair part replying to Sophia’s suggestion; 
in a subtle way this emphasizes Sophia’s role as the one responsible for dealing with her own 
correspondence with friends. In addition, Sophia’s use of the word “another,” coming right after 
Lucy finally seems to concede the existence of a first reply, serves to further establish the 
original reply as given, cementing her own position. 
 Sophia’s position, then, evolves through the interaction from an implicit I could have 
written a letter, to I think I did write it, to I did write a letter and probably mailed it. It is not 
possible to know whether this progressive strengthening is in any way a conscious or 
subconscious attempt to increase her perceived competence and authority in the conversation as 
part of a reaction against Lucy’s initial challenge to her ability, or whether she honestly is 
searching her memory and finding more and more certain evidence in her mind that she actually 
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wrote the reply. However, given everything she knows about her mother’s situations, and her 
subsequent experience helping her mother write “another” note to Roz, Lucy still believes 
strongly that Sophia could not have written back on her own, and therefore was not basing her 
increased certainty on accurate memories (informal interview, January 2011). This leaves wide 
open the possibility that the development of Sophia’s position is at least at some level a 
continued reaction against Lucy’s challenge to her assessment of her own ability. In any case, 
she skillfully manipulates the talk from Lucy challenging her memory and suggesting a course of 
action, into Lucy accepting her version of events (thereby conceding that she could have done it), 
and Sophia herself suggesting a further action. 
 The second sequence I examine is prompted by a remark by Sophia that people she goes 
to dinner with never ask her a second time. This remark prompts Lucy to suggest that Sophia 
take the initiative to make the invitation, to which Sophia replies that the system for inviting 
people to eat with you “is in the process of being radically changed.” When Lucy asks for 
elaboration of this, through an extended series of questions she is able to determine that Sophia 
feels that the lack of smaller tables in the new location of the dining hall makes it harder to 
converse with people. After Lucy seems to accept this account of the problem, Sophia continues 
with a second account: 
(2a) 
52 Sop:  It’s a change. 
53 Luc:  Different. Right. 
54   (2.0) 
55 Sop:  [And,] 
56 Luc:  [Hmm,] int’resting. 
57 Sop: →A U:h, it’s more awkward to get there. 
58   (1.4) 
59 Sop:  [  To the dining room. ] 
60 Luc:  [That I don’t understand.] Why:. 
61 Sop:  It’s in a different space. 
62 Luc:  ↑Yeah so? It’s next to the space it ↑was in. 
63 Sop:  Yeah but people have to you know figure out how you 
64   do this thing no:w. Where- where do you go to get i:n 
65  →A and u:h (.) check with the nurses, and stuff, 
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66 Luc:  I have a hard time believing that. [‘Cuz I’ve]= 
67 Sop:                    [°(   )°] 
68 Luc:  =been in that dining room. It’s right ↑there. There’s 
69  →C not- there’s nothing new about checking with the 
70  →C nurses to find out where the dining room is. 
71   [ That d- ]= 
72 Sop:  [But (  )] 
73 Luc: →C =that doesn’t make sense. 
74 Sop: →R Well (.) it feels awkward and people say that. 
75 Luc:  Do they? 
76 Sop:  [Yeah.] 
77 Luc:  [Mmhm.] 
 
 The line I wish to focus on is line 74, but to get there we must understand the sequence 
leading up to this line. Sophia’s assertion (as part of her account) in line 57 is greeted first with 
silence and then with a statement by Lucy that she doesn’t understand (in contrast to the first part 
of the account, which she subtly repeats her acceptance of with the emphasis on “that”). Sophia’s 
further attempts at elaboration are rejected, culminating in Lucy’s assessment in line 73 that it 
“doesn’t make sense.” In this case, instead of using a series of questions to draw out details of 
the explanation, after her first question (“Why:,” line 60), Lucy simply rejects Sophia’s 
description of the situation, with increasingly less mitigation or hedging, eventually stating 
bluntly that there is nothing new about checking with the nurses and that Sophia’s account is 
illogical. 
 The strategies that Sophia uses in this case to reestablish her authority are slightly more 
complex than in the previous example. Specifically, she emphasizes in two different ways that it 
is her own domain of authority that she is describing: the words “feels” and “say” both receive 
heavy stress in her response, and these are the key elements that allow her to counter Lucy’s 
criticism in a way that preempts further similar criticisms. By emphasizing “feels,” she reframes 
the assessment of the situation as awkward into a statement of her own subjective experience of 
it, which is something Lucy has much less authority to challenge than a more objective statement 
about the procedures involved. The second part of the turn preemptively blocks Lucy from 
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responding in any way that minimizes Sophia’s subjective experience as unfounded or 
unrepresentative of the views of the other (mostly less impaired) residents of the home, by 
explicitly presenting her own feelings as shared by “people” in general. By shifting the focus to 
her own experience of the new set-up and backing up that subjective assessment with reported 
consensus among “people,” Sophia effectively reestablishes herself as the expert on this issue 
and blocks Lucy’s channels for dismissing her claims. Indeed, Lucy does not immediately repeat 
her challenge, but rather responds, as in the previous example, with a confirmation question, 
before acknowledging Sophia’s revised claim in line 77. 
 It is again interesting to examine the subsequent development of the talk. While Sophia, 
perhaps desiring to leave the topic that caused trouble now that she has reestablished her position, 
moves back to the issue of larger tables, Lucy is apparently not quite ready to let the question of 
the new location go without resolving her doubts about why it is an issue. Her restatement, 
however, is sensitive to Sophia’s previous reaction in that she reshapes it as a failure of her own 
understanding (lines 81-82): 
(2b) 
75 Luc:  Do they? 
76 Sop:  [Yeah.] 
77 Luc:  [Mmhm.] 
78   (1.0) 
79 Sop:  And if you have tables of six and eight people, 
80 Luc:  Well, the size of the tables I can understand that but 
81   the location of the dining room, it’s hard for me to 
82   understand that as a problem since it’s right the:re, 
83   it’s actually closer (.) [than it used to be.] 
84 Sop:               [  It i:s but it- ] but 
85   it- it’s new and people have to learn how to get 
86   there, an’ it= 
87 Luc:  Mmhm, 
88 Sop:  =takes longer and they (0.4) go out mo:re, I don’ 
89  →A know why. Something. 
90 Luc:  Mmhmm:. 
91   (1.2) 
92 Luc:  But it sounds like wh- the tables are the biggest 
93   (.) prob↑le:m, would you say? That it’s not as 
94   private? 
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In line 84, Sophia jumps in after Lucy’s slight pause with emphasized agreement with her 
observation that the new location is closer, and then goes on to offer a string of further assertions 
about the dynamics of the new arrangement and how “people” are reacting to them, culminating 
in an admission that she doesn’t know exactly why, but “something.” While in a way this seems 
like a weakening of her position, the effect is actually to reinforce the marking of this topic as 
being in her domain to assess: by increasing the vagueness of her claim (and you cannot get 
much more vague than “something”), and shifting the focus further onto how other people are 
reacting, she constructs her claim as increasingly difficult for Lucy to refute. In fact, by 
admitting some failure to understand the exact problem on her own part, she brings herself closer 
to alignment with Lucy’s position without actually changing or renouncing her position that the 
new location is a problem. Indeed, Lucy appears to be left with no option other than a token of 
agreement (line 90), and after a short silence, she now moves to minimize the importance of the 
second part of Sophia’s account and return to the issue of the tables, seeking agreement from 
Sophia that this is the main problem.  
 In this example, in contrast to the first example, Sophia somewhat paradoxically 
increases her authority on the issue by successively weakening the epistemic strength of her 
claim: from it is awkward to it feels awkward and other people agree to people go out more and 
I don’t know why. This progression is not as different from the progression in the previous 
example as it appears on the surface, however. In this case, the claim that Lucy challenges is not 
about Sophia’s own ability, but rather it is about Sophia’s evaluation of the situation at her 
retirement home. By shifting the emphasis to her subjective experience of the new set-up and to 
her observations of how other residents are reacting, Sophia strengthens the extent to which her 
claims are located in a domain Lucy cannot easily challenge (her actual feelings and experience), 
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rather than a domain Lucy may feel more able to question (the specific logistics of the new set-
up). In the previous example, Sophia strengthens her initial claim that she has the ability to write 
a card to her friend by citing an increasingly strong memory of having actually done so. Again, 
falling back on her own memories and experience, something Lucy has no easy avenue to 
challenge directly. In this second example as well, Sophia manages over the course of this talk 
not only to defend her position, but to effectively block Lucy from challenging her further by 
emphasizing the domain under discussion as her own area of authority. 
 The final sequence that I examine is shorter, and different from the first two examples in 
that the challenge, in a sense, comes not from Lucy but from Sophia herself. I include this 
example to demonstrate the subtlety that Sophia is capable of utilizing in pursuit of saving face 
and maintaining the appearance of being able to accurately evaluate her own situation and state 
of knowledge. In extract (3), Lucy and Sophia have been talking about ways to make it easier for 
Sophia to listen to music during the day. 
(3) 
01 Sop: →A1 And I don’t know where the records a::re, and (.) 
02   which things go whe:re. 
03 Luc:  Right. But that’s- you’re living in a place where you 
04   have lots of help. That’s the whole point. You: don’t 
05   have to know all that. There are only three or four 
06   places in the room where records could be:, and in 
07   fa:ct, 
08   ((lines omitted; Lucy looks in drawers for records)) 
09 Luc:  They’re in that bottom drawer. ((points to top of 
10   dresser)) So: let’s make a little si:gn that goes 
11   right he:re that says records in bottom drawer. 
12   (3.0) 
13 Luc:  Right? 
14 Sop:  Well I don’t really think I need it because if you ask 
15   me where they are I’ll tell you. 
16   (1.2) 
17 Luc:  Did you know they were in the bottom drawer? 
18   (0.6) 
19 Sop: →A2 I think so. 
20 Luc: →C But you just- No::, you just told me that part of what 
21   makes it difficult to play records is that you don’t 
22   know where they are. 
23   (0.4) 
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24 Sop: →R That’s sort of true too. 
25 Luc:  ↑Right. 
 
 This sequence starts in line 01 with Sophia’s assertion that she doesn’t know where the 
records are, offered in the context of reasons that it’s hard for her to play music. Lucy moves to 
address Sophia’s worry by locating the collection of CDs and proposing a specific action 
designed to make it easier for Sophia to determine the location of the records in the future. 
Sophia fails to respond to this suggestion; the extended silence in line 12 indicates trouble, 
possibly in comprehension, prompting Lucy to seek agreement with her suggestion more 
explicitly in line 13. Sophia’s response is not to agree, but to dissent and give a reason that a sign 
on the dresser is unnecessary: “if you ask me where they are I’ll tell you.” Since Lucy has just 
found the CDs in the bottom drawer, it is reasonable to assume that Sophia’s assertion in lines 
14-15 is locally true; at that moment she knows where the CDs are, and therefore does not see 
the need for a sign reminding her. Lucy, remembering the previous talk (which it is not clear 
Sophia does), hesitates before responding to Sophia’s self-contradictory assertion. Lucy’s 
question in line 17 cleverly reframes the issue into the past tense, perhaps with the intent of 
subtly reminding Sophia that while she may know where the CDs are now, she did not know a 
moment ago. This technique fails to work – in fact, although Sophia’s claim in line 19 is 
mitigated in strength by “I think,” the fact that she extends her claim into the past means that the 
contradiction with her claim in line 01 is now more intractable (which is why it is this line that I 
identify as the second contradictory assertion). Lucy, therefore, resorts to explicitly confronting 
Sophia with her contradiction, cutting off the original design of her turn as a simple statement of 
Sophia’s previous claim (“But you just-”) in order to add an emphatic “No::,” thereby not only 
reminding Sophia of her previous claim, but explicitly negating Sophia’s own stance on her state 
of knowledge (line 19). 
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 The ingenious construction of Sophia’s line “that’s sort of true too” in line 24, however, 
allows her to get through her turn without admitting to any self-contradiction or failure in short-
term memory, and simultaneously allows the conversation to proceed and even prompts Lucy to 
agree with her in line 25, establishing the two as being back in alignment. This feat is 
accomplished through two key elements: the mitigating “sort of,” and the cohesive devise “too.” 
Had she said simply “that’s true too,” the blatant contradiction would remain, and Lucy may still 
have felt the need to clarify or challenge. By adding “sort of,” Sophia introduces enough 
ambiguity into her claim that she can avoid blatant logical contradiction without renouncing the 
entire truth of either of her stances. The inclusion of “too” on the end of her sentence assumes 
(and therefore reasserts in the face of Lucy’s “No::”) the truth of her more recent statements 
(lines 14-15, 19). While it is not heavily emphasized, reasserting the truth of her previous turn in 
this subtle manner marks it as assumed in her turn and therefore not as easily up for further 
debate than it might have been had she restated her knowledge of where the CDs were more 
directly. In this way Sophia is able to simultaneously increase the ambiguity of her claim in order 
to smooth over the apparent contradiction, and reassert her previous claim (that she knew where 
the CDs were) in the face of stark rejection of it by her daughter, thereby avoiding an overt loss 
of face or authority by simultaneously claiming both of her (opposing) positions as at least 
partial truth. 
 Unlike the previous two examples, the issue is not developed further in the subsequent 
talk. What this example underscores is the range and flexibility of Sophia’s attention to not 
losing face. In the first two examples, her own claims were challenged by Lucy, and she 
responded skillfully to these challenges to emphasize the domains in question as hers and block 
Lucy from further challenges. In this case, while it is Lucy who articulates the challenge, the 
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conflict is not between Lucy’s assertion and Sophia’s; it is between Sophia’s current assessment 
of her knowledge, and her assessment of a couple minutes previous, as reported to her by Lucy. 
Hence her task is more complicated than defending herself against her daughter. That she is able 
to construct a sentence that avoids admitting her own contradiction, renouncing either of her 
positions, or prompting further expansion of the sequence by Lucy is impressive and noteworthy. 
 
Discussion 
 I have examined three extended sequences of talk in which Sophia’s daughter, Lucy, 
initiates an explicit challenge to an assessment or assertion made by Sophia about a domain of 
knowledge reasonably assumed to be more Sophia’s expertise than Lucy’s. In this section I 
summarize and synthesize the main observations from this analysis, and discuss the importance 
and implications of the practices I have examined. 
 First of all, as pointed out during the analysis, each of the examples has the same basic 
sequence structure:  
1. An assertion by Sophia about something within her traditional domain of expertise (her 
own abilities, the dynamics of her retirement home, her state of knowledge); 
2. A challenge by Lucy, opposing or contradicting Sophia’s assertion without 
acknowledgement of Sophia’s greater claim to epistemic authority; 
3. A response by Sophia successfully reestablishing herself as the authority on the domain 
in question and avoiding loss of face. 
 While my analysis focused on the features of Sophia’s responses more than Lucy’s 
challenges, it is very important that the challenges are delivered as assertions of fact, without 
explicit indication of sensitivity to the fact that the domains of knowledge in question would 
Retrievable at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/tesolalwebjournal 
85 
normally be considered more Sophia’s than Lucy’s. It is not only the content of Lucy’s turns that 
constitutes the problematic challenge; it is their construction as an unmitigated statement of fact 
that truly marks these turns as undermining Sophia’s right to hold the superior epistemic 
authority on issues pertaining to her own situation. Lucy is not orienting, in these examples, to a 
desire to minimize loss of face for Sophia and maintain agreement and harmony.  
 Since Sophia does not hesitate to describe her own failings of memory and inability to do 
things she used to be able to do, I believe it is Lucy’s presumption of equal or greater authority 
that Sophia is primarily responding to. Her responses seem designed to emphasize her epistemic 
authority and force Lucy at the very least to structure her talk to acknowledge this authority. To 
accomplish this, she makes use of a few different techniques:  
1. Turn design: By (re)contradicting Lucy’s assertions without any typical markers of 
dispreferred disagreement, Sophia can mark her claims as more authoritative than Lucy’s and 
emphasize her right to be the one making the assessment. Features of turn delivery include 
overlap with Lucy’s talk, heavy stress, and lack of hesitations, pauses, filler words, or mitigating 
accounts for her disagreement. 
2.  Emphasis on subjectivity or personal experience: By emphasizing the subjective nature 
of her claims, or framing her claims as grounded in actual experience, Sophia can effectively 
block Lucy’s ability to challenge them directly. This includes appealing to the actions and 
opinions of other people with whom Sophia has daily contact and Lucy does not. 
3. Ambiguity: By weakening the strength and specificity of her claims in the face of 
contradiction by Lucy, Sophia is able to avoid renouncing her positions while leaving her exact 
stance vague enough that Lucy cannot effectively undermine it by appealing to specific 
information or logic. 
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4. Cohesive devices: Sophia seems able to utilize cohesive devices, such as “another” and 
“too,” to subtly reassert or assume the truth of her previous claims in subsequent turns; since the 
reassertion is indirect and not the focus of her turn, it is less open to direct challenge from Lucy. 
 Through skillful application of these techniques, Sophia navigates her way through the 
three examples above without overt loss of face in the form of allowing herself to be corrected or 
contradicted about her own ability, experience, or knowledge. The obvious question, then, is “so 
what?” Surely these techniques, or similar, are employed routinely in the course of 
disagreements and arguments of all sorts of people in all sorts of contexts. To have uncovered 
them in just a few examples of the conversation of one woman, then, does not on the surface 
seem worthy of all this discussion. However, there are several reasons for proposing that these 
practices and abilities on the part of Sophia are worth noting and analyzing.. 
 First of all, the specific flavor of the general category of “disagreement” that occurs in 
these conversations is not one likely to be commonly found in the conversations of fully 
competent adults. As discussed above, the other-initiated challenges to epistemic authority 
involve specifically an act of blatant and unmitigated negation or denial by Lucy of something 
that would normally be considered to be clearly more in Sophia’s domain to assess than in 
Lucy’s. Therefore, these are not mere instances of disagreement about the facts; they pose a 
threat to Sophia’s role in the conversation as an equal, an adult capable of assessing the facts of 
her own life accurately and logically. These challenges highlight and reinforce an underlying 
asymmetry in the talk: Sophia is impaired and Lucy knows it. While Sophia freely admits to 
being aware of certain new limits to her memory and ability to do routine things, even these 
admissions could be seen as underscoring her desire to appear competent to, at the very least, 
understand her own situation accurately. This exact type of asymmetry and challenge to 
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epistemic authority is likely to occur primarily in conversations involving an adult known to be 
cognitively impaired in some way; therefore, examining the techniques employed to respond to 
this type of challenge can bring an added dimension  to both the study of various forms of 
disagreement, and the study of the interactions of cognitively impaired adults. 
 Secondly, many previous studies of the interactions of DAT patients have focused 
primarily on the limitations of their talk, or differences from the conversations of normal adults 
(see Perkins et al. (1998) for discussion and some exceptions). This study focuses on uncovering 
conversational resources that Sophia is able to use skillfully to deal with a type of challenge that 
she is subject to due to her impairments. This underscores the obvious fact that while DAT does 
affect conversational abilities in some ways, it does not necessarily affect the desire to participate 
as an equal adult in conversations, nor the ability to detect when a conversation partner’s turn is 
not respectful of that status as equals. It is important that research and analysis seek to discover 
the competencies and skills that people in Sophia’s position bring to an interaction, and not 
solely the limitations. 
 Finally, the discovery of Sophia’s sensitivity  has important implications for family and 
caretakers of dementia patients. In the course of being interviewed for this study subsequent to 
the analysis of the data, Lucy admitted while she often “has to remind [her]self that [Sophia’s] 
assessments of her own situation should really be taken seriously,” she hadn’t fully realized the 
extent to which she sometimes dismissed her mother’s apparently false or contradictory 
assessments of her own situation (informal interview, January 2011). The analysis from this 
study helped her realize that she should be more conscious of framing her talk in ways that 
accord Sophia the proper authority over her own domains of experience. We can see in the talk 
analyzed here some techniques for doing this and maintaining alignment even in the face of 
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contradictory or confusing assertions by Sophia; such techniques include persistent questioning 
to get at the details of Sophia’s claims (as was effective in understanding the first of her accounts 
in the second example, about the size of the tables), and framing challenges as failures in Lucy’s 
own understanding of the situation. If family and caretakers of dementia patients are attuned to 
this issue and these techniques, tension and loss of face can better be avoided. 
Conclusion and Further Research 
  The talk I have analyzed exhibits what might be confusingly called an asymmetric 
perception of asymmetry: the daughter seems occasionally to shape her responses in ways that 
betray orientation to a systematic difference between her mother’s ability to assess the situation 
and her own, while the mother resists this implication of asymmetry, and shapes her own talk to 
reassert herself as an equal. Even when the differences between Lucy’s cognitive capacities and 
Sophia’s are made relatively explicit, as in the third example in which Sophia blatantly 
contradicts her own position of a couple minutes previous, Sophia still seems oriented toward 
shaping her talk locally to avoid loss of face and avoid explicit admission of her inconsistency. 
Her turn design seems oriented toward asserting her epistemic authority; the study of the 
techniques she uses, then, adds to the observations of Heritage and Raymond (2005) about 
negotiation of epistemic authority in agreement sequences, in this case within a particular type of 
disagreement sequence. These examples also illustrate another environment in which 
disagreement seems preferred. In Lucy’s case, the unmitigated negations of Sophia’s claims may 
have been motivated partially by frustration, and in Sophia’s case, her responses seem primarily 
concerned with saving face and defending her authority. Sensitivity to these potentially 
threatening challenges by family and caretakers of cognitively impaired adults could help 
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maintain harmonious interactions and decrease frustration and sense of helplessness in the 
patients. 
 Obviously, this is a small-scale study, and is very small-scale and therefore limited in 
scope and generalizability. Given the relative infrequency of these challenge sequences within 
the data and the logistical constraints on gathering video data, only a handful of examples were 
available for analysis. A clear step for further research is simply gathering significantly more 
data from a variety of patients in situations like Sophia’s, in the hope of collecting more and 
more examples. With a larger corpus of data, further details and patterns in this type of sequence 
may emerge. In particular, more work is needed to examine the specific techniques used by 
caretakers in order to deal with seemingly inaccurate or contradictory assessment without 
subjecting the patient to significant loss of face or the undermining of epistemic authority. I 
believe the threat to face that I have uncovered in this study is particularly insidious, since it 
involves a challenge not just to the patient’s ability to do and remember things, but to her ability 
to accurately assess and represent her own situation. For early- or intermediate-stage dementia 
patients like Sophia who are aware of the increasing limits on their abilities, being able to, at the 
very least, be trusted to understand their world accurately may feel like a final foothold on an 
identity as a true adult participant in interaction. Therefore, I hope that further investigation of 
the issues I have begun to explore here can contribute to the growing understanding of the 
conversational interactions of cognitively impaired adults, and can help family and caretakers to 
be conscious of the design of disagreement or challenge turns. 
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Appendix 1: CA Transcription Symbols  
 
.    falling intonation 
?    rising intonation 
,    continuing intonation 
-    cut-off 
::    elongation of sound  
word    emphasis (more underlining for greater stress) 
↑word   raised pitch on the following syllable 
°word°   quiet speech 
[ word1]   overlapping speech.  
[ word2]  
 
=    continued utterances of the same speaker 
(2.4)    length of a silence in seconds  
(.)    micro-pause 
(   )    non-transcribable talk.  
((action))   nonverbal activity.  
{((action))- word} simultaneous talk and nonverbal activity 
 
